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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Arvind Gupta, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his post-judgment “Motion for 
Leave to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.”  Because the appeal does not present a 
substantial question, we will grant the appellees’ motions to summarily affirm the order 
of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
In May and June 2009, Arvind Gupta filed complaints with the Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), alleging that Wipro, Ltd. took unauthorized 
deductions from his wages and from the wages of other employees.  An Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Gupta’s complaints and the Administrative Review Board 
(ARB) affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal.  Thereafter, Gupta filed a complaint in the District 
of New Jersey.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment, Gupta v. Perez, 101 F. Supp. 3d 437 (D.N.J. 2015) (Gupta I), and we 
summarily affirmed, Gupta v. Sec’y U.S. Dept. of Labor, 649 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. May 
5, 2016).     
In September 2015, Arvind Gupta filed a third complaint with the WHD.  The 
WHD found no reasonable cause to investigate because the complaint was filed outside 
the one-year limitations period.  Gupta next filed a complaint in the District of New 
Jersey, seeking to compel the WHD to investigate his claims and asserting that he had 




the District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that Gupta’s 
claims were barred by claim preclusion because he “either raised, or could have raised, 
all of the claims asserted in this case in Gupta I.”  Gupta v. Wipro Ltd., No. 17-cv-01954, 
2017 WL 6402636, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2017).  We summarily affirmed.  Gupta v. 
Wipro Ltd., 749 F. App’x 94, 98 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2018).  Later, we affirmed the District 
Court’s denial of Gupta’s motion to reopen and its entry of a filing injunction against 
Gupta.  Gupta v. Wipro Ltd., 765 F. App’x 648, 653 (3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2019).   
On September 10, 2019, Gupta filed in the closed District Court proceedings a 
“Motion for Leave to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.”  Gupta asserted that “[n]ow 
that [he] has cured the pleading deficiency in his May/June 2009 WHD complaint by 
filing a new complaint in September 2015, he should be allowed to exhaust his remedies 
with the ALJ/ARB per the statutory framework as the new WHD complaint is not subject 
to FRCP 12 challenge in the administrative forum by the Administrator or Wipro 
defendants.”  He also claimed that his complaint was not barred by claim preclusion.  The 
District Court denied the motion, stating that “the instant action is closed, and [Gupta’s] 
claims have been fully resolved by this Court, and that decision has been affirmed by the 
Third Circuit.”  Gupta appealed.1   
 
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. 
v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1993) (post-judgment orders are final 
and immediately appealable), and review the denial of Gupta’s post-judgment motion for 
abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  




To proceed with his “Motion for Leave to Exhaust Administrative Remedies,” 
Gupta needed to reopen the closed District Court proceedings.  Therefore, we construe 
his motion as seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).  A movant 
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must file the motion “within a reasonable time[,]” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and must “show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the 
reopening of a final judgment.”  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). 
Gupta’s motion was filed almost two years after the District Court dismissed his 
complaint.  That period is longer than a reasonable time.  See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a motion brought under 
Rule 60(b)(6) two years after the district court’s judgment was untimely where “the 
reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original 
judgment”).  Moreover, Gupta failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.  Gupta 
asked to reopen the proceedings so he could “exhaust his remedies with the ALJ/ARB.”  
But Gupta’s complaint was not dismissed for lack of exhaustion.  Instead, the District 
Court properly held that Gupta’s claims were barred by claim preclusion.  Gupta, 749 F. 
App’x at 96.  Therefore, the opportunity to exhaust would not cure the defect that led to 
dismissal of the complaint.  Gupta also asserted that his complaint was not barred by 
claim preclusion.  We have already resolved that issue, however, and Gupta’s attempt to 
relitigate it did not warrant relief under Rule 60(b).  See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 
 




F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a 
substitute for an appeal, and legal error, without more, does not warrant relief under that 
provision).     
Accordingly, because we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Gupta’s “Motion for Leave to Exhaust Administrative Remedies,” 
we grant the motions to summarily affirm that were filed by Wipro and its president, 
Azim Hashim Premji, and by the Secretary of Labor, and we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  We also grant Wipro’s request for costs, and we direct that, 
going forward, responsive briefing in this Court from the appellees need not be filed 
unless we specifically order such a response.  The parties’ remaining requests for relief, 
including Wipro’s request for a filing injunction and Gupta’s motion to summarily 
reverse, are denied. 
